Why do Japanese workers work such long hours? Beginning with a series of cases in the 1950s, Japanese courts drastically curtailed firms' abilities to dismiss workers. As a consequence of the inability to dismiss workers legally, large Japanese firms hired a smaller number of workers than were necessary to fulfill capacity without overtime. Employers rely on the working hours of this undersized cadre of workers, carefully screened to rule out the slothful, as a buffer. In bad times, the size of the work force makes dismissal unnecessary. In good times, workers are forced to work long hours.
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While these court decisions led to an increase in working hours in the 1950s, recent laws have led to a decrease. In response to interest group demands of the late 1980s and 1990s, Japan passed legislation that directly limits working hours. At the same time, it liberalized rules regarding temporary emplo yees, allowing those persons to serve as the buffer instead of regular employees. As the statutory working-hour limits and market liberalization have taken effect, working hours have decreased.
INTRODUCTION
For most of the past half-century, Japanese workers have put in far more hours than their counterparts in other industrialized countries.
1 While long working hours may help explain Japanese economic success, they also are an inescapable part of the fabric of Japanese society, affecting such basic choices as domicile, marriage, childbirth, and children's education and development.
Various explanations have been offered to explain why Japanese workers appear to work so hard. Some scholars claim that the "lust for labor" is a "unique aspect of Japanese culture."
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The Japanese work ethic, as the story goes, is firmly embedded in Japanese society.
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Hierarchical relations and loyalty, grounded in Confucianism or feudalism, make workers work harder for their bosses and not question transfers. Japanese groupism discourages individual workers from selfishly leaving early, and encourages the drawing of a stark line between "permanent" and "non-permanent" employees. 4 Some studies additionally note that the relatively large number of family-owned businesses in Japan can explain long hours, or that long working hours are a tradeoff for early retirement.
5
More anecdotally, anyone who has spent time working for or with Japanese companies knows the amazing ability that many such firms have to create daytime busy work. Whether due to organizational structure, accepted decision making practices, or some inexplicable residue labeled as "culture," the Japanese workday at many firms seems to be filled with time-consuming meetings, briefings, and approval processes that accomplish little and require employees to work their hardest after sundown. The serious do work at night, and many of the slackers stick around because it's socially appropriate.
Each theory and anecdote is a plausible explanation for long working hours in some cases, and will not attempt to disprove them. In this essay, I want to explore a heretofore overlooked additional variable that can offer a much richer account of Japanese working life. And unlike some of the other explanations, this institutional variable can be altered in ways that might improve everyday Japanese life.
I hypothesize that Japanese labor law plays an important role in determining how much people work, especially at large firms that are the focus of this essay. Beginning with a series of cases in the 1950s, Japanese courts regulated the employment market to such an extent that it became practically impossible for most businesses, or at least large ones, to fire workers. As a consequence of the inability to dismiss workers legally, large Japanese firms hired a smaller number of workers than were necessary. Large employers rely on the working hours of this undersized cadre of workers, carefully screened to rule out the slothful, as a buffer. In bad times, the size of the work force makes dismissal unnecessary. In good times, workers are forced to work long hours.
In contrast to these hour-increasing decisions, recent labor statutes helped reduce working hours. In the late 1980s and 1990s, interest groups pressed the go vernment for solutions to the working-hour problem. The government responded by passing legislation directly limiting working hours. At the same time, the legislature liberalized rules regarding temporary employees, allowing those persons to serve as the hour buffer. The result is a model in which Japanese workers now work less than their U.S. counterparts.
The essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss the available quantitative evidence on working hours. Part II sets forth the relevant legal provisions. Part III discusses how the law affects working hours.
I. WORKING HOUR DATA
Long working hours and grueling conditions were commonplace in pre-war Japan. At the turn of the century, twelve-hour-a-day, six-day-a-week schedules were common. Many workers, especially women, lived in dormitories that were often compared to prisons, resulting in annual turnover rates of sixty percent at some factories.
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In 1911, the Factory Law regulated working hours. The Factory Law limited the maximum hours worked each day for women and children to twelve hours, with two days' rest each month, a schedule that could allow over 4,000 working hours per year. 10 It contained no restrictions on working hours for adult males.
By the 1930s, hours decreased slightly. In the mining industry in 1930, an average working day was nine hours, seven minutes, a figure that varies by no more than ten minutes over the course of the decade. 11 Nationwide figures are similar. The Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Labor collected survey data on daily working hours and number of days worked each month for workers at manufacturing firms with more than thirty employees. As Table 1 shows, the number of working hours for the period 1923-1939 is quite large. By comparison, in the iron and steel industry in the U.S in 1920, with about two-thirds of blast-furnace workers, and about three-fourths of Bessemer mill workers, working twelve-hour shifts, workers worked an average of 3270 hours annually, roughly equivalent to the Japanese numbers. But by 1926, working hours in that sector had fallen to 2860 annual hours, a figure higher than the U.S. manufacturing average, but still far below the Japanese numbers for the period.
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During the Occupation following World War II, the Japanese working hours regime was substantially revised by the 1947 Labor Standards Act ("LSA").
14 The LSA established a sixday, 48-hour work week, and provided six days of vacation for workers with one year of employment (arts. 32, 32(1), 39(1)). Employers could assign overtime work at time-and-aquarter pay so long as they entered into a so-called "Article 36 agreement" on overtime with a majority of workers (art. 36).
Compared to the grueling hours of the pre-war era, post-war hours were more reasonable, but still remained quite high. Two official sources of data on postwar working hours are 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 9
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The figure raises four observations. First, Japanese worker-reported data is always higher than employer-reported data. Second, Japanese hours peaked in the early 1960s, declined slightly during the 1970s oil shock period, and declined again in the 1990s. Third, Japanese workers historically work more than their counterparts in the United States. In 1960, they worked, on average, approximately 620 hours more. Finally, by 1993, U.S. employee-reported hours were higher than Japanese employee-reported hours, a result that reflects both increased U.S. reported hours for those workers and decreased Japanese reported hours.
PART II. LABOR LAW Japanese working hours are shaped by three specific aspects of Japanese labor law. First, the judicially created doctrine of abusive dismissal protects employee job security, and in turn drastically limits an employer's ability to dismiss a worker. In the early 1950s, courts expanded the just cause analysis to adopt an "abuse of rights" approach, holding that dismissals that abuse employee rights were illegal. By employing an abuse of rights approach -an approach with statutory justification in a general Civil Code provision (art. 1) to the effect that "no abuse of rights shall be permitted"-courts fashioned a much more subjective approach to determining the legality of dismissals.
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The subjective abuse of rights analysis has led to a much more stringent approach to employee dismissals. The Supreme Court's decision in the 1977 Kochi Broadcasting case is instructive and typical. 23 In that case, a radio station dismissed an announcer after he overslept twice in a two-week period. In some jobs, such a lapse might not be significant, but in this case, the particular announcer's slumber prevented him from reading the 6 a.m news; if anyone needs to be up at 6, this is the guy. The announcer then tried to cover up his error. In finding that the dismissal was an abuse of the employer's right to dismiss, the court noted that although the oversights damaged the "social credit of the company," plaintiff apologized in both cases, and that "the dead air time was not so long." As for the cover-up, the Court held that he was "not to be strongly blamed," because it came "as a result of his awkward position because of his repeated mistakes in a short period."
This abuse of rights analysis pervades employee dismissal jurisprudence. Courts have found dismissals to be abusive in cases in which an employee makes several serious 21 Foote, supra note 7, at 643. bookkeeping errors and engages in personal phone conversations during working hours, 24 and when a salesman enters a coffee shop in the middle of the day. 25 As the Supreme Court explains, "If, under the specific circumstances of the case, the dismissal is unduly unreasonable so that it is not appropriate based on the common sense of society, the dismissal will be void." 26 As the "common sense of society" is determined by giving great weight to facts favorable to employees, the result is an extremely restrictive set of restrictions on dismissal.
In 2003, many of these common law principles were codified. The LSA was revised to state that dismissal must be based on "reasonable grounds" and must be acceptable "in light of social norms." 27 If the standard is not met, dismissal constitutes an abuse of right. While
caselaw has yet to emerge, it seems likely that the relevant "social norms" will be those that have been shaped and buttressed by fifty years of common law cases. other means, such as transfers or layoffs. Third, the selection of workers to be dismissed must be fair and reasonable. Finally, the procedures for dismissal must be proper. 30 The 1990 Sanyo Electric Company case 31 provides insights into the workings of the rule.
In Sanyo, as a result of economic hardship brought on by the rising yen, trade friction, and competition from cheap imports, the defendant company dismissed 1,200 staff members. The
Osaka district court noted that the business environment was bad, and that some sort of measures may have been necessary. But the court nonetheless noted that "the company as a whole would have had enough reserve capital to endure the situation," and that the company should have "made every effort" to clarify which persons truly needed to be eliminated, and even then, they
should have been given the option of voluntary resignation. Because the defendant did not make "sufficient effort to examine ways to avoid dismissal," the dismissals were deemed invalid.
The doctrine is applied quite broadly. It extends to fixed-term contract employees, as courts have long held that the renewal of fixed-term contracts on a regular basis may create a "regular employment" relation. 32 In 1991, the Osaka High Court went a step further, reversing the District Court to hold that the dismissal doctrine applied to a one-year contract that had never been renewed, despite the company's financial distress and the fact that the employee in question was not very competent. 37 See, e.g., Sheldon Garon, The State and Labor in Modern Japan (1987); Andrew Gordon, The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853-1955 (1985) . One theory posits that Japanese judges enforced the no-dismissal rule in no small part due to their personal experiences. As one Japanese judge explains, Japanese judges were the Japanese "intellgentsia" immediately after the war, yet their salaries were quite low, so low that they "could not buy enough food to eat." The no-dismissal policy thus reflected a sort of solidarity with workers. Koji Tanabe, Rodo Funso to Saiban [Cases and Labor Disputes] 310-11 (1965). 38 Gilson & Roe, supra note 8, at 526. adopted by labor historians.
39 Whatever the precise cause, it is clear that judicially created rules on employment forced compliance and diffused employment practices throughout the country. who declined a request to work overtime. In Hitachi, a plant union had entered into an Article 36 agreement with management to allow overtime. The employee had previously been insubordinate, and in this particular instance the overtime requested was not the result of a booming economy, but was necessary to correct errors that arose from the employee's prior negligence. The Court held that the overtime provision was a result of the management-labor bargain, and that the company thus was authorized to request overtime work.
The decision is significant both as an exception to the general rules regarding dismissal, and in light of the fact that it seems to go against prevailing social pressure. As for the former, the Court simply upheld the preexisting labor-management bargain: job security for control. As for the latter, at the time of the Court's decision, working hours had become a significant social issue. The Court's decision here, as well as other judicially created exceptions, appears to 39 See, e.g., Andrew Gordon, The Wages of Affluence: Labor and Management in Postwar Japan 184 (1997)(noting that courts gave "legal force to what was concurrently taking root as an implicit customary bargain"); Moriguchi, supra note 6, at 65 (courts "legitimized" and "consolidated" the practice). 40 The bargain may be rational, as workers are risk averse and prefer job insurance, or, as Kazuo Koike, Masahiko Aoki, and Yoshiro Miwa have all separately argued to some degree, they may receive additional rents as the controlling group of the firm. Kazuo Koike, Understanding Industrial Relations in Modern Japan (1988); Yoshiro Miwa, Firms and Industrial Organization in Japan 205 (1996); Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy (1988).
oppose social trends in the name of protecting the existing bargain, suggesting support for the judicial activism argument.
B. Statutory Working Hours Reductions
By the 1960s, the consequences of extreme working hours were evident. Japanese workers were beginning to notice that despite having one of the most productive economies in the world, workers enjoyed relatively few of the productivity gains in the form of working time reductions. Although the "death from overwork" (karoshi) syndrome was not to become a major social issue until the early 1980s, health-related problems ostensibly caused by overwork had begun to appear.
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In the early 1970s, the Ministry of Labor attempted to reduce working hours through informal regulation. 44 In 1976, the Central Labor Standards Council formally recommended a reduction in working hours, but argued that because of the diversity of working practices and industries, continued informal regulation was preferable to direct legal regulation. 45 The
Ministry of Labor continued to hold the position that workhour reductions were best achieved through negotiations between management and labor, and that the Ministry's role was simply to 41 categories. The Law now instead lists only the jobs for which dispatched workers may not be employed, such as construction, port labor, and medical jobs, but each category is rather broadly crafted.
Second, the Law divides dispatch services into "general" and "specified." "General" dispatch services are for short-term workers who register with an agency. Although "specified" services are only required to give notice to the Ministry of Labor, "general" services must be formally licensed (arts. 5-7). Part II showed that the judicially created non-dismissal policy, whether a result of judicial activism or merely a reflection and subsequent distribution of a developing bargained norm, substantially limits the ability of employers legally to dismiss employees. As a result of the inability to dismiss, employers have historically been unable to vary the number of employees with the workload. Employees thus face two options. If they hire too many workers, those workers might be busy in good times, but they will be idle in bad times, and, unable to dismiss them, employers will be forced to internalize their costs. If they hire too few workers, this smaller cadre will force lower internalized costs in bad times, but will have to work many more hours in good times. Employers in Japan historically have chosen the latter option, and as a result, workers are forced to work extremely long hours during period of need. If they refuse, in accordance with the non-dismissal bargain, they can be fired.
Recent overtime data tend to support the claim. In 1989, when the Japanese economy was booming, annual overtime for companies with more than 500 workers was 246 hours. After the bubble burst, 1993 average overtime was 153 hours. 61 As Yasuo Suwa explains:
Overtime work functions as a sort of invisible work force which will minimise the number of surplus employees during business downturns. . . . Total work hours in Japan, in fact, tend to be quite responsive to business fluctuations: they become longer during business booms and shorter in recession. For this system to work, employers must exercise intense scrutiny at the hiring stage to find hard workers and weed out lemons. This is exactly what Japanese employers do.
Companies "exercise great care in their initial hiring decisions," even to the point of hiring private investigators. 63 Of course, the evidence of future hard work available to Japanese employers at the time of the initial employment decision may not be as reliable as, for instance, billable hours in a law firm at the time of the partnership decision. 64 Although many companies do not rely heavily on university grades (almost universally acknowledged in Japan as a relative time of rest) in making hiring decisions, they do rely heavily on which university an applicant attended, thus using the entrance examination as a sort of proxy for hard work, and rely quite heavily on grades from high schools for applicants without a university education.
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Employees also self-select for hard work. Just as hard-working young lawyers flock to large law firms that demand high billable hours, so, too, do young Japanese workers join firms that suit their workstyle. If these young workers decide that the workpace is not for them, evidence suggests that they leave the firm; for males in their twenties, turnover rates at Japanese firms are 20 to 25%.
66
Lazy workers not cut out for large firms have three primary options options. First, they can quit and work for small firms, which are not subject to the non-dismissal bargain. While large firms ordinarily cannot meet the "genuine need" standard necessary to lay off workers, small firms can more easily do so. Second, they can continue in their sloth until their employer 63 Foote, supra note 7, at 654. transfers them to a small-firm subsidiary or otherwise related firm, which can fire them. 67 Third, in a few cases, they stick around as "madogiwazoku," literally, window-gazers who show up for work every day and are not terminated -in large part because of the difficulty of dismissal. 71 Kazuo Sugeno, Koyo Shakai no Ho, supra note 58, at 64-5 (1996) . 72 In a 1994 Supreme Court case over fee amounts charged by a head-hunting agency, the Court held that an agency, because it "mediates" relations between employers and employees, was bound by the fee provisions of the services for the blue-collar unemployed. 73 The lack of job-placement services limits the free flow of labor and buttresses the no-poaching rule. 75 In other cases, courts have similarly found poaching by former employees to give rise to tort liability (but not contract liability) when it exceeds "reasonable limits" or is done in bad faith, 76 and that managers who quit and take employees with them may violate fiduciary duties to the firm. 77 Such limits could help create a closed external market.
Anti-Poaching
c. Retirement packages. Japanese firms often pay lump-sum retirement bonuses and severance fees upon an employee's termination, a practice that the Supreme Court views as a combination of reward and deferred wages. 78 Employers routinely insert a standard provision in employee contracts and firm work rules to the effect that the payment will be reduced -perhaps to zero -if the employee competes with the firm after termination. Courts generally only enforce such clauses when the employee acts in bad faith. 79 Although such an approach limits the legal enforceability of the provisions, the vagueness of the standard does little to discourage over-broad provisions.
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B. Statutory Working Hours
As the maximum number of hours allowed under the LSA decreased beginning in 1987, average hours worked in Japan began to fall. In fact, working hours fell at a greater rate than any other industrialized nation. 81 Of course, the law may have been as much a reflection of trends as a cause. But statutory revisions are a significant part of the story in explaining the endogenization of working hour norms.
C. Temporary Employment Arrangements
The historical limitations placed on fixed-term contract employees, dispatched workers, and job-placement services have two principal effects on working hours. First, the historical inability of employers to use such non-standard employees as a labor buffer means that permanent, regular employees are forced to perform that function. Second, in addition to the real effects on working hours of regular employees the reliance on labor employees may lead to higher average working hour statistics, as the pool of surveyed workers is less likely to include part-timers than other industrialized countries. In each case, it is likely that the liberalization of such arrangements that began in the mid1980s contributes to the visible trend of reduced working hours. As more nonstandard employees are hired, working hours are shifted to them from regular workers. And they are being hired -the number of such employees rose from 580,000 in 1994 to 1.75 million in 2001. 82 As those employees constitute a greater portion of the workforce, average hours across the entire workforce decrease.
D. Social Factors
The legal institutions (working within the marcoeconomic context) that I have described in this essay do not explain the totality of working hours. Worker opinion in Japan, as elsewhere, is heterogeneous. 83 Legal institutions are simply one part of the mix of factors that affect preferences, or bargains between management and labor, 86 some of the effects of which might be seen even in the absence of law.
This argument is important. Although sociocultural factors might be difficult to quantify and "prove" precisely, the lack of evidence does not disprove the fact that such forces might nevertheless be at work. I offer one argument and two pieces of evidence in response.
First, social factors, in particular underlying norms (in this case, acceptability long hours) that lead to judicial and legislative change, are unlikely to be unanimous. The expression of norms in the form of legislation or judicial opinions has the effect of standardizing existing practices among groups that might otherwise not follow the norm. Although some groups might still disobey the law just as they would disobey norms, legal and financial penalties offer disincentives in addition to existing social sanctions against such behavior.
In the case of working hours, labor law, through sanctions against dismissal, creates a universal need for workers in large firms to work long hours. Of course, law does not supply the motivation for hard work; some workers work hard because they like it, some because others do, some because they do not want to be transferred to less prestigious positions or ultimately fired, and, for that matter, some because they prefer work to their families. The selection and selfselection processes of hiring at Japanese firms help ensure that workers are properly sorted to fill the legally induced need. laid off. 90 Many Japanese workers dread a return to Japan after an overseas posting, as working hours outside of Japan, where subsidiaries tend to be more adequately staffed, are not as grueling. 91 The only particular scrutiny adopted in hiring at U.S. subsidiaries appears to be cover attempts to screen potential union members, not detailed background investigations.
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One likely explanation for the differences between U.S. and Japanese practices might be culture. Japanese subsidiaries in the United States might adopt U.S. cultural practices, even if their management is Japanese. I find this explanation to be unlikely in many cases, especially given frequent turnover of Japanese management, many of whom have neither time nor inclination to "Americanize." Instead, the differences in practice suggest that the institutional argument has considerable predictive power. A more likely reason why Japanese-run institutions in U.S. differ so apparently from Japanese-run institutions in Japan is that those in the United
States function under the influence of U.S. institutions. Japanese labor laws only apply in Japan, and Japanese subsidiaries in the U.S. accordingly look more like U.S. firms.
None of these arguments regarding the role social factors is dispositive, nor or they intended to be. Social factors matter. Social factors drive legal change. But at least in the context of working hours, the evidence suggests that law is an important part of the mix.
CONCLUSION
Law historically has made working life difficult in Japan. Workers work extremely long hours for a variety of reasons, but in part because institutions prevent worker dismissal in bad times and because other labor buffer options are limited. But two silver linings exist. First, 90 Duane Kujawa, Japanese Multinationals in the United States (1986) 91 See, e.g., Yoshi Noguchi, Dropping Out of Tokyo's Rat Race, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1992, at C11.
